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Abstract: Some social policy analysts argue that the shift from PAYG towards more capital 
funding in pension policy in many European countries does not necessarily imply neo-liberal 
privatisation, but will probably lead towards a genuine social-liberal third way, i.e. socially 
regulated `welfare markets´ reconciling the tension between individual liberty and social 
solidarity. However, the scientific rationale of the term welfare market is uncertain because it 
was not exactly specified how this reconciliation should precisely be possible and what are 
the theoretical motivations and distinctive institutional features of welfare markets compared 
to unfettered markets and welfare states. While for paradigmatic critics of the shift towards 
capital funding this term must appear as a euphemistic oxymoron, neo-liberalism dismisses 
social regulation of pension markets as futile or even harmful. Refuting both objections and 
filling the theoretical gap, this article establishes a rationale for the term welfare market by 
showing why and how funded pension provision can be socially regulated, i.e. in a manner 
which takes concerns about social justice seriously while preserving basic market features. 
Finally, it is exemplarily examined whether funded pension regulation in European countries 
is actually heading towards welfare markets.  
 
 
1. Welfare Markets – The Future Direction of Pension Policy? 
 
Since the 1990s, PAYG pension systems in European countries have been under increasing 
political pressure. Regarding (projected) increases in PAYG contribution rates as 
economically unsustainable, many governments have enforced considerable cutbacks to 
PAYG benefits. Thus, citizens will increasingly have to rely on financial markets for securing 
status maintenance after retirement. What does this development mean for the future direction 
of pension policy? 
While some social scientists speak of neo-liberal `privatization´, i.e. the `surrender of public 
responsibility´ for citizens` welfare (Gilbert, 2002), others have objected that the term 
`privatization´ does not adequately capture the ongoing pension policy change (Nullmeier, 
2001: 646; Leisering 2006). Instead, they expect public institutions and market mechanisms to 
become increasingly intertwined: future pension policy will neither equal the establishment of 
unfettered markets as advocated by neo-liberalism nor the preservation of the provider 
welfare state of the social-democratic 20th century, but the emergence of public regulatory 
frameworks shaping markets in due consideration of social criteria. Legitimacy pressures 
concerning economic security in old age are supposed to prevent governments from 
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instituting unfettered markets. Less state via shrinking PAYG replacement rates is expected to 
be balanced by more state via social regulation of funded pensions. This is said to result in a 
new third way of pension policy, i.e. so-called welfare markets reconciling the tension 
between individual responsibility and social solidarity. Thus, social-liberal hybridisation 
instead of neo-liberal privatisation appears to be the more adequate analytical term.  
However, the rationale of the term welfare market can be queried. On the one hand, neo-
liberalism alleges that competitive markets represent the most efficient institution already 
producing maximum welfare for all participants (Berthold and Thode, 1998: 334). Hence, 
social regulations appear futile or even harmful. On the other hand, for paradigmatic critics of 
the shift from PAYG to funded pensions, the notion that pension markets can be regulated in 
accordance with principles of social justice seems to be a squaring of the circle from the 
outset. They predict that the shift towards more capital funding leads us back to the 
`nineteenth century´ (Schmähl, 2006) with its high extent of old-age poverty. Thus, the term 
welfare market appears to be a euphemistic oxymoron.  
Therefore, it is problematic that the meaning of the term welfare market has only been 
broadly conceptualized as (socially regulated) markets pertaining to services the provision of 
which was formerly organized according to welfare state principles (Nullmeier, 2001; Taylor-
Gooby, 1999). No attempt was made to thoroughly substantiate and clearly specify the 
theoretical rationales of the term welfare market and to describe its distinctive institutional 
features by which empirical analysis could distinguish them exactly from free markets and 
welfare states. But this is indispensable for empirically testing the hypothesis that European 
pension systems are being transformed into welfare markets. 
Analysing the current scientific literature regarding funded pension regulation, a distinctive 
social-liberal ideal-type to be called welfare market can indeed be derived from this literature 
and distinguished from two other ideal-types of providing funded pensions, namely unfettered 
funded pension markets and funded pension welfare states. The concept of welfare markets is 
neither futile nor does it represent a euphemistic oxymoron. Firstly, it is doubtful that 
unfettered pension markets are efficient let alone equitable welfare producers. Expanding on 
Taylor-Gooby`s (1999) critique, my analysis shows that many consumers in unfettered 
markets do not behave like rational actors. Therefore, they are subject to `market 
manipulation´ (Hanson and Kysar, 1999a + b; Bar-Gill, 2004). Secondly, a regulatory 
framework can be established that takes deviations from rational behaviour and concerns 
about distributive justice into account, thereby trying to encourage trust in markets (Taylor-
Gooby, 1999: 111). This regulatory framework can be implemented without abandoning basic 
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market features (autonomy, choice, competition), thereby giving rise to socially regulated 
markets.  
To substantiate my claims, I construct three different ideal-types of regulating funded pension 
provision which I dub Neoliberal Voluntarism, Social Liberalism, and Social-Democratic 
Collectivism. Chapter 2 describes their different general normative stances towards 
regulation. Chapter 3 identifies five regulatory challenges impacting the adequacy, equity and 
efficiency of funded pension provision, to which the ideal-types prefer different institutional 
responses in accordance with their respective core values and convictions. The purpose of the 
ideal-typology is to serve as a theoretical tool to comparatively and empirically assess the 
ideological nature of future regulatory policies, i.e. to determine to what extent funded 
pension schemes resemble neo-liberal unfettered markets, social-liberal welfare markets or 
social-democratic welfare states, whether the degree of collective responsibility for status 
maintenance in old-age is rather low, intermediate or high, and to what extent national 
regulatory policies diverge/converge. Chapter 4 shortly exemplifies the application of the 
ideal-typology to funded pension schemes in three European countries. 
 
 
2. Three Ideal-Types of Regulating Funded Pension Provision 
 
Max Weber, founder of the scientific concept of ideal-types, explains their scientific 
construction and function as follows:  
 
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of 
view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present 
and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged 
according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical 
construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found 
empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. Historical research faces the task of 
determining in each individual case, the extent to which this ideal-construct 
approximates or diverges from reality. (Weber, 1949: 90) 
 
Based on Kohl`s (2000: 116 ff.) recourse to Weber`s conception of ideal-types for social 
policy analysis, I define an ideal-type of funded pension regulation as a theoretical construct 
representing a specific pattern of regulation, i.e. an internally consistent, normatively monistic 
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configuration of regulatory institutions based on a few core values and ideological 
convictions. Ideal-types must be distinguished from national systems, which often more or 
less mix regulatory measures reflecting different norms. An ideal-typology functions as a 
coordinate system (ibidem: 119) which enables empirical research to determine which 
national system is closer to which ideal-type and to analyse whether reforms of regulatory 
policies indicate a reinforced hegemony of an ideal-type (and its underlying ideology) or 
represent a shift towards another ideal-type. 
Sorting out the various recommendations, concepts and norms contained in the theoretical 
literature concerning funded pension regulation, three ideal-types can be constructed. They 
correspond to three different general understandings of social justice described by Kersting 
(2000: 46 ff.). 
Firstly, the ideal-type Neoliberal Voluntarism - corresponding to an unfettered market - 
follows the concept of structural egalitarianism, the egalitarian aims of which are directed at 
a basic legal framework ensuring equality of formal rights to individual freedom, but which 
is not concerned about unequal actual capabilities of different individuals to successfully use 
their freedom. 
Secondly, the ideal-type Social Liberalism - corresponding to a welfare market - follows the 
concept of resource egalitarianism, the egalitarian aims of which are directed at the equality 
of actual basic personal and situational preconditions of action of different individuals, so 
that all citizens have sufficient resources and capabilities to take advantage of their freedom. 
However, divergences in the outcomes of actions are tolerated, because equalizing these 
would require overly paternalistic interventions in individual autonomy.  
Thirdly, the ideal-type Social-Democratic Collectivism - corresponding to a welfare state - 
follows the concept of welfare egalitarianism, the egalitarian aims of which are directed at 
increasing the equality of individual welfare outcomes.  
 
2.1. Neoliberal Voluntarism 
 
Neoliberal Voluntarism is a market fostering gestalt of funded pension regulation derived 
from neo-liberalism. The normative funded-pension-model recommended by Littlewood 
(1998) comes close to this ideal-type. Its core values are liberty and individual responsibility. 
Human beings are regarded as rational, self-interested actors. Competitive markets are 
supposed to produce maximum welfare for all participants. The task of the state is just to 
ensure 1) provider competition, 2) security of private property rights, 3) a reliable legal 
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framework and 4) that citizens receive financial education and information about providers, 
products etc. Instead of adapting markets to individuals and their possible weaknesses, 
individuals should be made fit for vibrant financial markets by endowing them with financial 
savvy. The relation of the regulatory system to the individual can thus be termed releasing, 
reflecting the libertarian conviction that individuals should be freed from state paternalism 
and learn to help themselves. 
Thus, Neoliberal Voluntarism endorses an unfettered market for funded pensions. 
 
2.2. Social Liberalism 
 
Social Liberalism is a market shaping gestalt of funded pension regulation derived from 
`Libertarian Paternalism´ (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003) and its application to funded pension 
regulation (Cronqvist, 2003; Gallery and Gallery, 2005; Iwry, 2005; James, 2005; Mitchell 
and Utkus, 2003). It rejects coercive state paternalism, but accepts a responsibility of the state 
to enable citizens to live a self-determined life by offering them a financially supportive and 
easily manageable institutional framework for retirement saving. Core values are real, not 
only formal autonomy and self-determination. Social Liberalism strives to balance social 
solidarity and individual responsibility/liberty by creating openings for individual choice 
while retaining a non-paternalistic state responsibility for the well-being of citizens 
(Leisering, 2006).  
As Social Liberalism regards human beings as boundedly rational actors, its general 
conviction is that unfettered markets with complex products like pensions are prone to fail. 
Empirical research shows that many people have overconfident delusions about their 
competence to choose appropriate financial products and often make unwise decisions as they 
are misled by systematic cognitive biases, which are hardly remediable by financial education 
(Erturk et al., 2005; Mitchell and Utkus, 2003). However, instead of abolishing individual 
choice, Social Liberalism prefers the state to put suggestive, beneficial institutional frames 
and monetary incentives in place steering (not: forcing) people in welfare-promoting 
directions (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003). The relationship of the regulatory system towards the 
individual can thus be termed enabling. Freedom of personal choice is retained because it 
provides procedural utility by increasing the sense of personal control which correlates with 
increased life satisfaction (Iyengar et al. 2003, 2). Active, self-responsible management of 
own assets (instead of passively receiving state entitlements the value of which is subject to 
the vicissitudes of politics) is said to be empirically related to long-term health, individual 
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well-being, marital stability, higher educational attainment - even when controlling for 
intermediate variables like income and education (CSSS, 2001: 28 f.). 
Thus, Social Liberalism endorses a welfare market for funded pensions - market mechanisms 
are basically preserved, but the market is socially shaped.  
 
2.3. Social-Democratic Collectivism 
  
Social-Democratic Collectivism is a market neutralizing gestalt of funded pension 
regulation, derived from traditional social-democratic universal welfare philosophy (Rothstein 
1998). Its core values are solidarity and security. The starting point of this ideal-type is that 
most people are risk-averse. They put a high value on the predictability and security of 
(expected) living conditions (Meyer, 2005: 130). Moreover, they are not merely self-
interested, but also driven by a sense of justice. People oppose markets when they think that 
participants do not receive the outcomes that they deserve according to principles of 
distributive fairness (Walster et al., 1978). 
The normative funded pension model of Modigliani and Muralidhar (2004) comes close to 
this ideal-type, because it stresses the importance of intergenerational solidarity and puts a 
high value on the security and distributive fairness of funded pension provision. Detrimental 
financial market effects, particularly the `welfare costs of defined contribution schemes´ 
(ibidem: 71), should be prevented. As its central aim is to offset the volatility and insecurity 
of financial markets, the relationship of this regulatory system towards the individual can be 
termed ensuring. To achieve this security, individual choice is sacrificed.  
Thus, Social-Democratic Collectivism endorses a welfare state for funded pensions. 
 
3. Five Institutional Challenges of Regulating Funded Pension Schemes 
 
Following Leisering (2006), funded pension regulation is defined here as comprising all legal, 
organizational and financial means by which collective actors (state or social partner 
organisations) can respond to (anticipated) failure of financial markets. Five1 potential market 
failures jeopardizing the security, efficiency and equity of funded pension provision - and 
                                                 
1
 Further market failures - price discrimination against females (because of their higher average longevity), 
longevity risk (meaning retirees` myopic preference for lump sums instead of annuities) (Munnell and Sunden, 
2004: 143), the problem of adverse selection in annuity markets, and inflation risk - cannot be treated here 
because of spatial limits. 
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thereby status maintenance in old-age - can be identified: myopia, volatility risk, choice risk, 
high charges, and insufficient saving resources. 
The institutional response to each of these potential failures preferred by the ideal-types 
differs by the degree of collective versus individual responsibility for the handling of these 
challenges and hence by the extent of social policy, because Girvetz (1968, 512) 
conceptualized social policy as societal, i.e. collective responsibility for citizens` wellbeing. 
Neoliberal Voluntarism assigns responsibility first and foremost to individuals. Social 
Liberalism favours the sharing of responsibility between individual citizens and public 
authorities. Social-Democratic Collectivism prefers responsibility to be taken over by 
collective actors (public authorities or social partners).  
 
3.1. Myopia  
 
Myopia refers to the possible human tendency to undervalue future needs in old age compared 
to current desires. Should the state enforce saving in funded schemes for status 
maintenance? 
Neoliberal Voluntarism endorses voluntary opt-in schemes, because individuals are regarded 
as rational, farsighted actors (Homburg, 1997: 65; von Weizsäcker, 2003: 30f.). Mandatory 
contributions to funded pension schemes are rejected because people perceive them as a tax 
(Börsch-Supan, 2004), creating labour disincentives and promoting the black market. 
Governments should only provide individuals with correct information about declining PAYG 
pensions (ibidem). 
Social Liberalism, on the contrary, points out that the empirical evidence for myopia is well 
established (Munnell and Sundén, 2004) and that it cannot be remedied by education 
(Mitchell and Utkus, 2003). Especially individuals with low social status are prone to short-
sightedness regarding retirement planning (Munnell and Sundén, 2004: 58). But even many 
middle-class people ignore the effect of compound interest and begin to save too late, 
necessitating considerably higher contribution rates to achieve status maintenance than under 
a prudent approach (Davis, 2004: 20).  
However, because of its respect for individual autonomy (citizens may have good reasons for 
temporarily interrupting retirement saving) and to prevent encouraging illicit work, Social 
Liberalism abstains from mandating saving and resorts to automatic enrolment: all adult 
persons are automatically enrolled in funded pension plans, but are allowed to opt out. 
Strikingly, participation rates jumped from about 40% to about 85% as some occupational 
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pension plans in the US switched from voluntary opt-in to automatic enrolment with opting-
out possibility (Mitchell and Utkus, 2003: 5). This shows that - contrary to the rational actor 
model - many people do not possess well-defined savings preferences but are inert and 
heavily influenced by institutional frames. Via automatic enrolment, Social Liberalism tries to 
strengthen and equalize the different individual mental preconditions of retirement saving, i.e. 
differing personal capabilities regarding self-control and long-term planning. 
Social-Democratic Collectivism advocates mandating retirement saving as voluntary 
approaches do not reach full participation. Only compulsory saving guarantees that every 
pensioner is reasonably protected against his/her myopic young self, which is easily tempted 
by over-consumption because of status competition in unequal capitalist societies. Moreover, 
only mandatory participation effectively prevents annuity market failure because of adverse 
selection (Davis, 2004: 18, 28). 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Volatility Risk 
 
Volatility Risk refers to the fact that financial market developments are quite volatile, not only 
in the short-term, but even over retirement saving periods of up to 40 years. The corollary is 
that members of different birth cohorts even with equal contribution sums and identical 
investment strategies accumulate quite different retirement capital sums just because of 
historically different market developments. Moreover, different cohorts are confronted with 
different rates for converting accumulated savings in annuities because their amount depends 
on the different interest rates prevailing at retirement. This results in considerably different 
benefit levels for different cohorts (Burtless, 2000). Alier and Vittas (2001) found that the 
replacement rate for the luckiest cohort is three to four times higher than the replacement rate 
for the unluckiest cohort (max-min-ratio). Consequently, the contribution rate necessary to 
achieve a certain pension level is difficult to specify ex ante, and expectable benefit levels are 
quite unsure.  
Nevertheless, Neoliberal Voluntarism endorses Defined Contribution (DC) plans. Contrary to 
empirical evidence (Burtless, 2000), some authors allege that financial market volatility only 
causes short-term fluctuations and is allegedly `irrelevant´ (Börsch-Supan, 2000) for long-
term investments like pensions. Others argue that private insurance markets will automatically 
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provide reliable benefit guarantees if people request these (Hellwig in an interview with 
Heusinger and Ramspeck, 2005).  
Contrary to this, Social Liberalism recognizes volatility risk. As employees are commonly 
poorly informed about this risk and take no precautions (Mitchell and Utkus, 2003: 18), 
savers should be automatically enrolled in `life-cycle-funds´ (Munnell and Sunden, 2004: 
175). These funds aim to protect people against unexpected asset downturns before retirement 
by shifting the equity-bond-mix of the investment portfolio automatically gradually towards 
less volatile bonds with increasing customer age. Citizens can opt out of these funds but then 
must explicitly state that they are aware of volatility risk. The goal is to strengthen and 
equalize unequally distributed individual preconditions of action, namely different individual 
cognitive capabilities to consciously consider and handle volatility risk.    
Social-Democratic Collectivism perceives the huge and arbitrary cohort inequalities produced 
by the financial market `lottery´ as unfair and `repellent´ (Modigliani and Muralidhar, 2004: 
58 f.). The insecurity inherent in DC systems is regarded as being contrary to peoples` 
preference for secure benefit levels (Van Rooij et al., 2004). As even life-cycle-funds can 
reduce the Max-Min-Ratio merely to 2,7:1 (Alier and Vittas, 2001: 407), Social-Democratic 
Collectivism endorses intergenerational risk-sharing within funded Defined Benefit (DB) 
schemes. 
Modigliani and Muralidhar (2004) have developed a sophisticated funded DB model based on 
the assumption that individuals are the least capable unit to bear volatility risk and that the 
latter are more easily borne if fairly distributed across cohorts. Their model operates with a 
guaranteed rate of return (ibidem: 38) equalling the rate of return on assets expected in the 
very long term and, concomitantly, a guaranteed income replacement rate. Individuals pay 
mandatory contributions to a single public investment fund which pools volatility risk across 
cohorts. Crucial for the functioning of this system are proper and transparent rules concerning 
the long-term-balance of its assets (value of total investments) and its liabilities (pension 
rights acquired). If the actual rate of return on assets is lower / higher than the long-term-
expected, guaranteed rate of return, assets are lower / higher than liabilities, and the plan will 
display a deficit / surplus. However, contrary to pure DC systems, short-to-mid-term 
deviations from the expected long-term trend are tolerated without changing contribution rates 
or benefit levels by allowing temporary deficits / surpluses. Only if there are persistent 
deviations from the expected long-term trend, meaning that assets are constantly below / 
beyond a certain percentage of liabilities, contribution rates should be adjusted (risen / 
lowered). 
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This balancing is called intergenerational risk sharing: if asset prices fall unexpectedly low, 
not only the few cohorts retiring at that time have to bear the whole burden as in a DC system. 
Instead, either formerly established surpluses are used for compensation or all active cohorts 
share the risk with the retiring cohorts by an increase in contributions (if the plan`s deficit is 
too high). Already retired cohorts can also be required to share the risk by partially reducing 
indexation of annuities in the case of unexpected massive long-term downturns. This would 
be an application of the Musgrave-Rule favoured by social-democratic welfare theory (Myles, 
2002) to a funded pension system: financial market risks are shared equally between all living 
cohorts, so that the net income relation between the working and the retired generation 
remains stable. 
Such a funded DB system is said to be both more efficient and fair:  
 
The intergenerational pooling of risks provides benefits for all cohorts. […] The 
solidarity between cohorts in such a scheme generates a substantial risk reduction 
in relation to individual saving. (Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy, 
2000: 45 ff.; see also Modigliani and Muralidhar 2004, 201) 
 
…in a DC plan the time horizon is the life of one individual, whereas in DB plans 
the time [i.e. investment, T.H.] horizon is much larger. For these reasons, DB 
plans on average can take on more risk and generate higher returns. (Modigliani 
and Muralidhar, 2004: 6) 
 
 
3.3. Choice Risk 
 
Choice Risk means that individuals may choose providers or investment products that are not 
appropriate.  
From the perspective of Neoliberal Voluntarism, competitive markets are the ultimate 
`discovery device´ (von Hayek) providing sophisticated customers with a wide variety of 
products perfectly suited to highly individualized preferences. Rational individuals will 
choose what is best for them. Sufficient prevalence of consumer sovereignty is not 
empirically examined, but is theoretically determined as given: `The assertion that employees 
are unable to obtain the knowledge to make a rational choice violates the presumption of 
consumer sovereignty.´ (Drew and Stanford, 2003: 105) 
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In contrast, Social Liberalism doubts the alleged merits of unfettered competition and choice 
in a market for complex products like pensions: `The lesson is that unfettered choice is a 
mistake in mandatory old age security systems because many workers are inexperienced in 
assessing financial alternatives. Structured choice is needed to prevent big mistakes and high 
fees´ (James, 2005: 9). Firstly, retirement plans offering too many investment options 
discourage participation by producing `choice overload´, i.e. by overwhelming many peoples` 
cognitive processing capabilities (Iyengar et al., 2003). Secondly, pointing out to widespread 
mis-selling of endowment mortgages and personal pensions in the UK (Erturk et al., 2005) 
and to empirical research showing that ordinary citizens are far from being rational investors 
(Mitchell and Utkus, 2003), it is argued that peoples` choices are often subject to non-rational 
cognitive biases. These are intensified and exploited by advertising (Kahneman et al., 2005). 
Hence, pension markets confirm the general thesis of `market manipulation´ (Hanson and 
Kysar 1999a + b; Bar-Gill 2004), according to which competitive pressures drive profit-
seeking providers to exploit consumers` non-rational cognitive biases by distorting their 
preferences and perceptions unless regulation prevents it. 
Cronqvist (2003) provides a thorough empirical analysis of customers` non-rational biases 
and their interaction with advertising in the Swedish Premium Pension market launched in 
2000. Although the government undertook intense efforts to secure that citizens are well 
informed, Cronqvist came to three central conclusions: 
Firstly, many people were subject to the familiarity bias: they preferred to choose funds with 
which they are more familiar irrespective of their adequacy. Providers in Sweden played on 
this cognitive bias by advertisements associating the pension fund with famous persons 
familiar to citizens like film-stars or by constantly spreading their brand name. They used 
these non-informative advertisements to avoid profit-reducing fee competition. Funds using 
non-informative advertisements indeed attracted most customers, although they charged 
higher fees, thereby considerably lowering account balances. Another form of familiarity bias 
is the preference of investing in home-country-specific funds. This exposes people to the 
highly problematic risk of undiversified portfolios. Some pension funds intensively played on 
such biases through advertisements by boasting that they invest exclusively in Sweden. As a 
result, active choosers put on average 48% of their contributions into Swedish assets. 
Secondly, many people were subject to the extrapolation bias. Swedes allocated more money 
to funds that stressed performance-advertising (i.e. displaying high returns in the recent past) 
because citizens regarded a fund`s past return as a reliable indication for its performance and 
extrapolated them into the future. But many studies (cited in Cronqvist, 2003) show that 
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reliance on past performance is an inappropriate investment strategy due to low long-term 
persistence of the returns of a fund. Good short- and mid-term performance of a fund is often 
simply the result of market luck. Pension funds in Sweden successfully played on this 
cognitive bias as performance in the recent past has been a common cue in advertising and 
attracted many Swedish customers. For example, the most popular fund displayed a terrific 
market performance of +534% in the years before the start of the Premium Pension Market, 
but exhibited a below-average market performance of -69,5% during the three years 
afterwards (Cronqvist and Thaler, 2004: 427). 
Thirdly, many people are inert because they are subject to the status quo bias (see also Van 
Rooij et al., 2004: 5). Although their initial choices were often inadequate, over 90% of 
Swedish contributors did not re-allocate their portfolios between 2001 and 2003 (Cronqvist 
and Thaler, 2004). Thus, funds with inadequate investment strategies were not punished to the 
extent necessary for competition to function appropriately.  
To summarize: 
 
The Swedish experience shows that many individual investors (indeed, many 
more than expected) paid attention to non-informative fund advertising, made an 
active choice, and chose portfolios with the opposite characteristics of those most 
economists would find attractive. (Cronqvist, 2003: 31) 
 
The combination of investor insensitivity to fees, responsiveness to marketing and 
eagerness to chase trends encourages mutual fund companies to charge high fees, 
to spend heavily on marketing and to launch specialized, poorly diversified funds. 
Thus investors get lower average net returns and greater potential variation in 
retirement wealth. (Kahneman et al., 2005) 
 
However, since Social Liberalism is committed to the idea of individual self-determination, 
personal investment choice should not be completely eliminated. Rather, appropriate choices 
should be promoted by automatically enrolling citizens in an institutional framework with 
adequately restricted choice (Cronqvist, 2003). The public regulator should construct a 
pension scheme with a few well-diversified index-funds with clearly distinguishable risk-
potentials managed by a few investment companies chosen in periodic competitive bidding 
(James, 2005). Index-funds are passively managed, i.e. they imitate the whole capital market 
by replicating the asset compilation of a market index (e.g. the S&P 500), instead of money 
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managers actively picking particular asset-mixes. Index funds significantly outperform net 
returns of average actively managed funds (James, 2005: 16; Vidler, 2003: 31) because they 
save on money manager staff without incurring lower investment returns. The motive behind 
such an `institutional market´ (James, 2005) is to enable individuals to take care of themselves 
by simplifying the situational preconditions of individual action, thereby strengthening and 
equalizing individual investment decision capabilities. An often mentioned example is the 
pension scheme for federal state employees in the US, the `Federal Thrift Savings Plan´.  
Social-Democratic Collectivism abandons individual choice and advocates monopolistic 
public or corporatist funds managed by independent boards chosen by the state/the social 
partners. Most people are regarded as uninterested in choice as nowadays passive behaviour 
in the Swedish Premium Pension and Australian Superannuation Scheme shows (Modigliani 
and Muralidhar, 2004: 222). Moreover, individual choice increases inequality. Research in the 
US shows that rich individuals have more investment experience and access to better advice 
than poorer people (ibidem: 59). The conclusion drawn from these observations is that… 
 
`…there is no reason to establish a set of pension companies who compete with 
one another to `beat the market´. By definition, not everyone can beat the average. 
So placing workers in pension funds that hold different assets is a prescription for 
increasing the inequality in their accumulated pension wealth. The simple way 
around this problem is to require that all workers` pension be invested in the same 
portfolio. In this case, one doesn`t need a pension industry to invest pensions or to 
pay high fees collected by top money managers.´ (Kotlikoff, 1999: 20 f.) 
 
According to Modigliani and Muralidhar (2004: 60 f.), the objection that the monopolistic 
public funds recommended by them are prone to mismanagement represents a neo-liberal 
myth propagated by the World Bank with the help of biased data samples. Insulation of the 
investment strategies of public funds against political meddling should be ensured by 
appropriate governance structures, especially the constitutional independence of the board and 
an indexed investment style (Modigliani and Muralidhar, 2004: 37). To prevent abuse of 
power in these monopolies, contributors can be given voice by electing member councils 
equipped with significant legal rights as in Dutch occupational schemes (Bieber and Schmitt, 
2004).  
 
3.4. High Charges 
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Whereas administrative costs in PAYG schemes are usually low, charge levels represent a hot 
topic regarding funded pension systems (Furman, 2005). Here, assets have to be managed, a 
variety of products developed and marketed, switches of customers between companies dealt 
with and profit expectations realised. Administrative costs are very important for the 
affordability of funded pensions because a yearly deduction of 1% of assets results in a 22%-
reduction of the capital accumulated after 40 years (Vidler, 2003: 29). Moreover, flat rate 
charges independent of account balances are particularly burdensome for low earners with 
small savings.    
From the perspective of Neoliberal Voluntarism, unfettered competition between private 
pension providers will automatically result in affordable fees (Gerber, 2003).  
 
Market competition ensures that profit aspirations steer companies` efforts in a 
direction which creates the highest welfare for all. This is the reason for the 
superiority of the market economy over all other institutional options. The task of 
the state consists in ensuring competition. (Vanberg and Goldschmidt, 2005; my 
translation)  
 
Social Liberalism does not share this unconditional faith in competitive markets but 
emphasizes that it is the structure of the market (its degree of centralization) that matters. In 
decentralized retail markets, average annual charges are huge, reaching 1,5% of assets in the 
US and 2% in Australia (James, 2005: 12). Likewise, it was found that administrative, 
switching and annuitization costs reduced accumulated retirement capital sums in the UK 
retail market by roughly 40% (Murthi et al. 2001). 
Besides diseconomies of scale and high marketing costs, this results from lower bargaining 
power of single consumers compared to that of collective (state/corporatist) actors bargaining 
on behalf of groups (citizens/employees). Moreover, consumers are inert, reacting only 
sluggishly to price differences in pension markets (Binswanger, 2005: 105). For instance, in 
Australia, 52% of all accounts are (mostly voluntarily) held with expensive, underperforming 
funds (Vidler, 2003: 34). Furthermore, expensive funds represent themselves successfully as 
low cost funds through advertisement (ibidem: 37) because it is very difficult for customers to 
infer actual cost levels from deliberately complicated charge structures (Erturk et al., 2005). 
`The upshot is that most laymen will hardly be able to perform such cost comparisons.´ 
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(Binswanger, 2005: 107 f., my translation). Again, this confirms the `market manipulation´ 
thesis (Hanson and Kysar 1999a + b; Bar-Gill, 2004). 
Therefore, Social Liberalism mandates that charges have to be levied as a percentage of 
personal assets equal for all accounts, so that individuals with large account balances 
indirectly subsidize individuals with low account balances (James, 2005). But most 
importantly, it advocates a centralized `institutional market´ like the `Federal Thrift Savings 
Plan´, where annual charges are kept down to a low level of 0,1% of assets (ibidem). Here, 
administration of payments and organization of individual accounts is centralized in one 
publicly administered complex (thereby exploiting economies of scale) and consumer choice 
is restricted (thereby lowering administration and switching costs) to six passively managed 
index-funds (thereby holding down asset management costs) administered by one investment 
company. The latter is periodically chosen by the public regulator through competitive 
bidding (thereby avoiding marketing costs), using its all-or-nothing bargaining power. The 
social-liberal motive behind such an institutional market is to enable citizens to take care of 
themselves by relieving them from needlessly high charges. 
Social Democratic Collectivism strives to reduce costs by exploiting economies of scale 
through a single national pension fund (Modigliani and Muralidhar, 2004) or industry-wide 
occupational funds (Ebert, 2001). Here, administration costs are reduced by obviating 
marketing, abolishing individual investment choice and administrating pension plans on a 
corporatist non-profit basis. Administrative expenses are indeed considerably lower in 
centralized industry-wide sector funds than in decentralized individual account systems 
(Döring, 2002: 115). 
 
3.5. Insufficient Saving Resources 
 
Some citizens may not have the financial means to afford to save in funded pension schemes. 
Should the state subsidize their accounts?  
From the perspective of Neoliberal Voluntarism, individuals themselves are responsible for 
their status maintenance. It suffices that the state provides a safety net against old-age 
poverty. Direct subsidies for saving in funded pension schemes are feared to put a strain on 
public finances and to create a culture of dependency, thereby undermining incentives to rely 
on individual efforts. 
However, Neoliberal Voluntarism also advocates the taxation of funded pensions according to 
the deferred expenditure taxation principle (Whitehouse, 1999), the EET-model: contributions 
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are deducted from taxable income (E), investment gains are tax-exempt (E), and only pension 
benefits are taxed (T). Therefore, saving is heavily indirectly subsidized because investment 
gains are not taxed. Moreover, in a progressive tax system, tax rates applied to benefits in old 
age are usually lower than those during working life (as personal income in old age is 
normally lower). Neoliberal Voluntarism endorses the EET-model because taxation of capital 
yields is regarded as `a disincentive to saving, because [then] consumption now is worth more 
than consumption in the future´ (Whitehouse 1999, 7). Furthermore, people perceive up-front 
tax relief as more valuable (ibidem, 36). Participation in voluntary pension schemes void of 
the tax incentives resulting from the EET-model is likely to be low. This would probably 
create political pressures to maintain PAYG pensions beyond subsistence levels - something 
which neo-liberalism wants to avert. 
The subsidization policy of Social Liberalism (Iwry 2005, 3 ff.) follows the EET-model, too. 
Discouraging saving by taxing contributions and investment yields is contrary to its intention 
to strengthen peoples` retirement planning willingness and savings resources. However, it 
critically recognizes that high income earners with high tax rates disproportionately benefit 
from the EET-model, whereas low income earners with zero or low tax rates do not or hardly 
benefit. This contradicts its goal to distribute preconditions of actions (here: financial 
resources for saving) more equally across different income strata. Therefore, Social 
Liberalism supplements the EET-model by direct state subsidies targeted at financially 
weaker people, gradually diminishing towards middle income levels (as in the German 
`Riester-Rente´ and the Australian `Superannuation Co-Contribution´). 
However, as Social Liberalism repudiates a culture of welfare dependency, these targeted 
allowances and their amount are made conditional on the amount of peoples` own 
contributions (relative to their personal income) (Iwry 2005, 16). Activating financially 
disadvantaged people to help themselves by offering them conditional public assistance 
corresponds to the social-liberal doctrine of rights and responsibilities. Empirically, 
contribution matching indeed enhances participation rates (Munnell and Sunden, 2004: 58). 
In contrast, Social-Democratic Collectivism is adamantly opposed to the regressive 
distributional effects of the EET-model (Hughes and Sinfield, 2004). For example, in the US 
(which operates an EET-system), two thirds of all tax exemptions granted go to the wealthiest 
20% of all citizens, while only one eighth goes to the bottom 60% of the income distribution 
(ibidem: 181). Hence, the expenditure taxation principle is held to be irreconcilable with any 
principle of equity (Hughes and Sinfield, 2004: 183). Therefore, Social-Democratic 
Collectivism endorses the comprehensive income taxation principle, the TTE-model, meaning 
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that contributions cannot be deducted from taxable income (T), investment gains are taxed 
(T), and only pensions benefits are tax-exempt (E). 
Instead of regressive tax exemptions, the Social-Democratic principle of universal solidarity 
commands that all citizens have a social right to a flat-rate cash allowance granted by the 
state. Financing this flat-rate subsidy out of progressive taxation, savings are redistributed 
from rich to poor citizens, corresponding to the Social-Democratic concern for reducing 
outcome inequality. These subsidies should not be targeted towards the poor, because targeted 
subsidies are feared to receive no political support from middle-class voters so that their real 
value will erode over time (due to insufficient indexation of these subsidies to 
inflation/wages). In contrast, universal social policies like universal subsidies for funded 
pensions receive middle-class support, so that political pressure will be high enough to 
maintain the value of these subsidies in the long-run (Korpi and Palme, 1998).   
 
 
 
4. European Funded Pension Schemes on the Way to Welfare Markets? 
 
Applying ideal-typologies to empirical cases does not mean assigning each national case to 
one ideal type but to `determine which (plural) of these types are to be found within empirical 
cases, in roughly what proportions´ (Crouch 2005, 26). This is done here with regard to 
funded pension schemes in the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK to find out whether 
regulation in European countries exhibits a convergence towards social-liberal welfare 
markets. In 1990, each of these countries belonged to one of three very different groups of 
pension systems: Sweden was part of that country group (besides Austria, France, Germany, 
Italy) which ensured average earners` status maintenance via mandatory public PAYG 
pensions. The Netherlands belonged to that group of small countries (besides Finland, 
Iceland, Switzerland) which secured status maintenance via (quasi-)mandatory, funded 
occupational pensions. In the UK and Ireland, participation in voluntary, funded private or 
occupational pensions was indispensable for status maintenance. Hence, the three countries 
are well suited to get a preliminary indication whether there is convergence towards social-
liberal welfare markets which erodes former institutional differences. 
The regulation of Dutch quasi-mandatory occupational pensions, regulated by two main laws 
dating back as far as 1949 and 1954, and managed by the social partners is dominated by 
Social-Democratic Collectivism. Participation is quasi-mandatory via statutorily extended 
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corporatist agreements, volatility risk is offset by intergenerational risk-sharing, and 
employees have no investment choice in the monopolist pension funds of industry sectors and 
large companies. During the 1990s, part-time employees, workers of temporary employment 
agencies and workers with fixed-term jobs have been integrated into the scheme, so that 
participation increased to 94% of the workforce. However, the taxation method (EET) 
corresponds to Neoliberal Voluntarism. Moreover, a few Dutch companies have recently 
switched to defined contribution plans (Van Het Kaar, 2004) so that the spread of 
intergenerational solidarity is no longer universal. But up to now, the social-democratic nature 
of the Dutch scheme shows a high degree of path dependence. Welfare market elements are 
missing. 
The regulation of the Swedish `Premium Pension´ scheme introduced in 2000 as a 
compensation for cutbacks in the PAYG scheme (ATP) mixes neo-liberal elements (defined 
contribution, unrestrained individual investment choice, EET taxation), social-democratic 
elements (mandatory participation, a guaranteed minimum interest rate of 2,7% for converting 
account balances in annuities, state contributions on behalf of unemployed and child caring 
people) and social-liberal elements. The latter consist in the fact that the administration of the 
pension market is carried out on a centralized basis by a public body, the Premium Pension 
authority (PPM), so that annual average charges are reduced to 0,7% of assets with further 
reductions to 0,25% expected in the future. Furthermore, those citizens who abstain from 
actively choosing a fund (meanwhile over 90% of new entrants) are automatically enrolled in 
a high-quality default fund (Cronqvist and Thaler 2004) managed by the PPM. The 
significance of this can be seen in comparison to the Australian Superannuation scheme where 
employers usually determine default funds which are of varying and often questionable 
quality (Gallery & Gallery 2005). While the Swedish Premium Pension scheme cannot be 
regarded as a welfare market, it contains some important elements of this ideal-type. 
In the UK, the `Stakeholder Pension´ scheme was introduced in 1999 to offset the declining 
coverage of occupational pensions. It is dominated by neo-liberal elements: participation is 
voluntary, investment choice is unrestricted and taxation follows the EET-model. To be sure, 
maximum annual charges are limited to 1,5% for the first ten years of membership and 1% 
afterwards, but this is a quite high level and providers are allowed to levy further hidden 
charges. The reason for the high charges is that - contrary to the Swedish Premium Pension 
scheme - administration is not centralised. Since April 2005, the scheme contains a welfare 
market element as subscribers are automatically enrolled in life-cycle-funds. However, the 
current dominance of neo-liberal over social-liberal elements is likely to be reversed. The 
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British government has recently released a white paper (DWP 2006) suggesting the 
introduction of a National Pension Savings Scheme (NPSS). As proposed by the Pensions 
Commission (2005), this scheme would feature automatic enrolment and centralized 
administration by a public body similar to the Swedish PPM, meant to reduce annual charges 
to 0,3% of assets. Moreover, the government explicitly conceded (DWP 2006, 56) that many 
Britons suffer from cognitive choice and information overload when it comes to financial 
investments. Therefore, the social-liberal delivery model of the Pension Commission, which 
has advised to limit the number of investment choices in the scheme to 6-10 appropriate funds 
(Pension Commission 2005, 376), is assumed to be the most suitable (DWP 2006, 56). The 
closer the final legislation to the commission`s proposal, the more the NPSS will resemble the 
social-liberal ideal-type of the welfare market.  
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Welfare markets for funded pensions aim to reconcile individual liberty/responsibility and 
social solidarity by defusing potential failures of unfettered markets via beneficial institutional 
frames and monetary incentives while broadly preserving basic market features (individual 
autonomy, choice, and competition) instead of abolishing these as traditional provider welfare 
states do.  
While longstanding, satisfactorily operating social-democratic funded pension schemes like 
the Dutch one exhibit path-dependency, recent reform legislation and proposals in countries 
with ailing pension systems like the British and Swedish one have increasingly resorted to 
welfare market elements and social-liberal ideas. The report of the British Pensions 
Commission and its impact on the government`s white paper represents the strongest 
indication up to date that the diffusion of neo-liberal pension policy is coming to an end and 
that future pension regulation will be increasingly infiltrated by social-liberal ideas.  
It remains to be seen to what extent welfare markets will actually achieve their aims. Welfare 
markets may have weaknesses. For example, because of possibly increasingly volatile capital 
markets (Aglietta & Rebérioux 2005) and in the face of financial market downturns possibly 
lying ahead in the coming decades - ironically because of demographic ageing (Davis and Li, 
2003) - intergenerational risk-sharing may be a more convincing response to volatility risk 
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than life-cycle-funds. However, intergenerational risk-sharing can be subject to regulatory 
failure as the myopic management of many Dutch occupational pension funds in the 1990s 
has shown (Grünell, 2002). Hence, the current shift from PAYG towards funding is no easy 
escape-route out of the problems posed by demographic ageing. 
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